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Dean Eastman:
Again, if I could have your attention. For those of you that
don’t know me, my name is John Eastman. I’m the Dean here at
Chapman University School of Law for about twelve more hours.
Let me take this opportunity to really acknowledge Kasey
Phillips; she’s done a phenomenal job organizing this symposium.
I would also like to thank the whole Editorial Board of Law
Review; you all have been working very hard and I know you’re
going to be looking forward to some long sleep tomorrow—but not
quite yet. Also, Donald Kochan and Ron Rotunda, the faculty
advisors to the Law Review. They both deserve a round of
applause as well.
Secretary Chertoff became Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security on February 15, 2005, and he served until the
very end of the Bush Administration in that capacity. Now, he’s
had a rather extraordinary career prior to that. He served as a
Circuit Judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal. He was
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at the
Department of Justice. As Assistant Attorney General, he helped
trace the 9/11 Terrorist Attack of the Al-Qaeda Network.
Before joining the Bush Administration, Secretary Chertoff
was a partner with the law firm of Latham and Watkins. From
1994 to 1996, he served as Special Counsel for the United States
Senate Whitewater Committee. After that, he spent more than a
decade as a Federal Prosecutor, including serving as United
States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, First Assistant
U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, and Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As United
States Attorney, he investigated and prosecuted significant cases
of political corruption and worked on crime and corporate fraud.
Secretary Chertoff, as a prosecutor, I suspect that the next
Attorney General of the State might be calling on you for advice.
Secretary Chertoff graduated magna cum laude from
Harvard College in 1975—we’d like to consider or call Harvard
the Chapman University of the East Coast—and magna cum
laude from Harvard Law School in 1978. He also served as a law
clerk for Supreme Court Justice William Brennan from 1979 to
1983. Please join me in welcoming Secretary Chertoff.
Secretary Chertoff:
I hope I didn’t chase the Dean out of office. For those of you
who believe in cause and effect analysis, I show up and then
twelve hours later you leave. So, I wish you the best of luck in
public service and your campaign. It’s a great privilege and a
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great job. It’s also a great responsibility, and it’s important that
people still want to get into the fray. These days are more and
more difficult an environment for everybody.
So I thought I’d talk about the nexus between terrorism and
the international drug traffic in organized crime, largely because,
of course, this is a conference about drug wars, and this happens
to be an area where there’s a great drug war happening. We
have a tendency to say everything is war, the war on poverty, the
war on drugs, the war on this—but some of these areas really do
have a war. There’s repeated violence and destruction, and when
we look at the intersection between terrorism and international
drug trafficking, I think we really do have a war. So, what I
thought I’d do is give you a little bit of a sense of change from the
beginning of this decade through the next decade. I’ll tell you
right up front, I’m not recommending legalizing drugs. I think
that would be a major mistake.
I first looked at the nexus between drug trafficking and
terrorism when I was head of the Criminal Division at the
Department of Justice. Some of you may remember that the
FARC, the Revolutionary Army in Colombia, which was a left
wing political organization, was very strong in the 1990s and the
early part of this decade. It has lost a considerable amount of
ground since then, partly because of our work with President
Uribe of Colombia and his people in really reforming the military
and pushing back against the FARC. But certainly they remain
a potent force, and they were very potent in the late 1990s and
the early 2000s.
We brought a series of indictments against the FARC for
various terrorism-related violations which included, among other
things, kidnapping people—including Americans—and holding
them for ransom. But one of the things that emerged as we
investigated was that the FARC had begun to migrate toward
becoming a classic drug organization. What happened first was
they began to encounter drug traffickers in the areas of Columbia
that they controlled, and then they began to charge them a tax or
a protection fee. This is similar to what organized crime often
does in the United States. They don’t directly engage in the sale
of drugs, but they essentially reap the benefits by extorting
money from the drug dealers, or taxing them and protecting
them against being ripped off.
So the FARC began to move into the protection racket, but
pretty soon that migrated into something a little bit more
enabling. They’d be involved in managing staging areas, helping
load airplanes, and ultimately they became full-fledged partners
in drug trafficking. And, in fact, we had indictments issued
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against the FARC that included both terrorism and drug
trafficking charges. In many ways, that was the first concrete
example of the intersection between a global criminal
organization involved in the drug trade—one that has access to
the modern tools of money, movement, communications, and
travel—with terrorist organizations who benefit from the money
and the enabling capabilities of the drug organizations, and who
can provide violence and the support of violence, which of course
is important for the drug organizations.
We’ve now seen this problem migrate from Colombia around
the world. It’s no secret in Afghanistan, for example, where the
cultivation of poppies creates a major source for heroin. It’s no
secret that the Taliban has protected and, in fact, is cooperating
with drug dealers, because they receive money from the drug
dealing and the drug trafficking. That money enables them to
buy arms and, not coincidentally, the drug activity winds up also
hurting the West and the enemies of the Taliban, so they get a
double bang for their buck. They have the ability both, in some
general sense, to strike at their enemies and, in a more specific,
narrow sense, to get the kinds of financing that they need in
order to acquire the weapons and trading capabilities which
allow them to be such lethal adversaries.
What we’ve now seen, however, is that this is moving into
South America, as well in places apart from Colombia. For
example, recent information tells us that there has been an
increase in the movement of cocaine from South America into
Europe. That’s partly a reflection of some of the progress we’ve
made in making it more difficult to bring drugs into the United
States. Partly, it’s a rise in demand in Europe, but what’s
interesting, for the purpose of my talk, is how it’s getting there.
And the way a lot of it is getting there is via North Africa. The
cocaine moves out of South America, often through Venezuela,
where, of course, Hugo Chavez is really a dedicated enemy of the
United States and the West and, therefore, very happy to be in a
neighborhood of drug trafficking. It then moves from Venezuela
into North Africa, where it is staged and ultimately sent into
Europe to be sold.
What we have learned is that in North Africa, groups
affiliated with terrorism, including Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb
(which is a North African group that is sympathetic and, in fact,
formally linked with the core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and
Afghanistan), have become involved in protecting the loads when
they arrive and while they’re being held in staging to be
ultimately shipped into Europe. And the reason for that, again,
is perfectly obvious, because it’s a source of money which enables
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them to recruit and buy arms and further their own political
goals. So, once again, we begin to see the capabilities of drug
organizations, and the money they generate, to create an
attractive partner for terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations also have the ability to provide the violence and the
security that is very important to the drug traffickers.
What I predict is going to happen is, at some point, some
trafficker is going to look in the mirror and say: “You know, I’m
not a drug trafficker. I’m a political insurgent.” We’re very close
to having that cross-over of political ideology, no matter how farfetched it is, beginning to engraft itself into the violence and the
mayhem that is part of the drug trade. That, of course, is going
to bring two dangerous adversaries together in a way which is
only going to multiply the problems for those of us around the
world who are trying to protect society.
Where this might touch this country most seriously is in
Northern Mexico. I know people in California know this, but it’s
not that well-known in other parts of the country—there’s
currently nothing less than a war going on in Northern Mexico
for the control and governance of the country. It is underway
because the President of Mexico has done a courageous thing—he
has recognized that tolerating the rule of drug organizations in
various cities in Northern Mexico is not an acceptable alternative
for a modern democracy. You cannot surrender parts of your
country to organized crime or narcotics trafficking gangs. And so
he made it his top priority when he came into office several years
ago to take these groups on.
Not surprisingly, when you strike at organized criminal
groups, they strike back. And the tactics that they’ve adopted in
many of the cartels in Northern Mexico are directly derived from
what they have seen on television or over the Internet in Iraq
and Afghanistan. We have beheadings. We have kidnappings.
We have bombings. We have torture. All the things that AlQaeda and the Taliban have done are now being used by these
organized crime cartels.
The reason is quite explicit. It is to terrorize the population
of Mexico so that either this President at some point will be
forced to pull back, or when the next election comes, it is more
likely to go to somebody who is either tacitly or overtly willing to
make peace with the cartels. That would be a disaster for the
United States. It would be the equivalent of putting Waziristan
on our southern border. It’s one of the reasons that, when I was
Secretary, we put into effect a process of contingency planning
against the remote—but nevertheless certainly not un-
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thinkable—possibility that we might have an increase in crossborder violence coming from Mexico into the United States.
The short answer here, of course, is to support President
Calderon in his effort. It’s one of the reasons that President
Bush pushed very hard for an initiative to send not only money
but weapons, training, and modern technology to Mexico to help
the Mexicans ramp up their own ability to fight the drug gangs.
This policy is continuing into the current administration, which
is also firmly committed to supporting Mexico in this endeavor.
But, again, I want to put before you the notion that if one of these
drug leaders one day decides that rather than thinking of himself
as a thug, he’d rather think of himself as a political leader, we
will have completed that merger between terrorism and
organized criminality, which I think we’ve seen in its incipient
phases in various places of the world.
It would be hard to complete this tour of the world and
where we are with respect to terrorism, organized crime, and
organized drug dealing without again returning to Venezuela.
Venezuela is, in many ways, the laboratory for what I think we’re
going to see in the twenty-first century: Nation-states that bring
together all the various strands that have posed security threats
to people around the world, whether they be in the West or in
Asia or in Africa. We know, for example, that Chavez tolerates, if
not directly facilitates, a drug activity which then, of course,
becomes passed on either to the United States or to Europe. We
know that Chavez has embraced terrorism—he has close
relationships with Hezbollah and Iran. He’s increased the
frequency of flights back and forth, and he has certainly
facilitated the penetration of Iran and Hezbollah into Latin
America.
Interestingly, about a year ago, I was told by a prosecutor
investigating a Magistrate in Argentina who was investigating
terrorist bombings in the 1990s that, as far back as the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, Iran had planted and sought to inject into
South America terrorist operatives, Hezbollah operatives, in
order to build some kind of an internal network in South
America, which they could use to further the aims of Hezbollah
and their own revolutionary goals. So this idea of bringing
together terrorism in South Asia and the Middle East and
merging it with the activities going on in South America is not a
new idea, but I would say that Chavez has really elevated the
profiling and the level of mischief to an unparalleled height.
So that is the world I think that we’re in, and it’s one that
has some very serious implications for where we go in the future.
And, the question for us is, how do we deal with this? There are
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several elements to a strategy, but the over-arching point is that
we are no longer in an era where the wars that we fight are
simply wars between nation-states. Since the seventeenth
century, wars have been conceived of as the kind of conflict that
only occurs between countries. That’s a product of some of the
treaty-making that occurred in the middle of the last millennium.
It’s also a product of the fact that we’ve all grown accustomed to
our historical study of conflict as being that between nation
states.
I think, in the twenty-first century and in this
millennium, we’re going to see something quite different. War is
going to involve not only state against state, but network against
state and network against network. That is the configuration of
modern society enabled by the communications, travel, and
financial tools which make up globalization.
Another element that is more and more evident is the
significance of ungoverned space in the globe, because what we
see now is that there are many states that do not actually fully
control the domain over which they have formal authority. We
see it in Afghanistan. We see it in Pakistan. We see it in
Somalia. We see it in Yemen. We see it even in certain parts of
South America. And with the leverage the technology, travel,
communications, and global finance bring to smaller and smaller
groups, these ungoverned spaces are no longer merely a domestic
law enforcement problem for the state in which they reside.
They are now a global problem because ungoverned space
becomes a platform from which people train, experiment, recruit,
and ultimately launch attacks against the rest of the world.
So, in the twenty-first century, we have to consider all of
these elements that have become neighbors of terrorism and of
international organized crime and drug trafficking, and we have
to have a strategy to deal with those. So let me outline for you
what we have done and what I think we need to continue to do in
terms of dealing with these kinds of issues. And, by the way,
since I’m at a law school I’ll say that one of the interesting
lessons I learned in the last four years is how pivotal legal
doctrine and legal authority is to a strategy for addressing all of
these problems.
It might surprise you—it certainly surprised me—that war
fighting is now increasingly a matter that involves legal advice.
You can argue we’ve overly legalized the war fighting, but
whether that’s true or not, it’s a matter of fact that more and
more commanders in the field, whether they’re in the intelligence
business or the military business, look to the legal authorities to
determine what they can do and what they can’t do. One thing
that’s been a little bit challenging is that the legal authorities of
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the twentieth century do not necessarily find themselves
configured for the twenty-first century. Again, that bifurcated
idea that you’re either in a war between states or in a
criminal/domestic-domestic/criminal
effort,
doesn’t
work
anymore, particularly when you can have networks that can
bring to bear the destructive force that used to be reserved only
for the most powerful nation states. So all the strategic things
I’m going to talk about now have real implications for the legal
framework in which we operate, both domestically and overseas.
So what are the things we need to do, from a strategic sense,
to deal with this global problem of terrorism and organized
crime? Well, the first thing we need to deal with is the issue of
ungoverned space. We’ve known for some time, and it’s been
openly discussed, that parts of the frontier area of Pakistan, in
Waziristan, and across the border in Afghanistan, have become
safe havens for terrorists. These are the places where recruits
are brought, indoctrinated, trained, armed, and ultimately given
the tools to go back to their home countries and carry out
terrorist attacks.
What I think has emerged publicly more recently is that it’s
not just Pakistan and Afghanistan; Somalia, which is virtually
ungoverned, has become a haven not only for terrorist groups
that recruit from the West, but also for pirate groups, which is
another species of international organized criminal activity.
Yemen is now much more in the news because of what happened
on December twenty-fifth, and I think people are now aware that
there are parts of Yemen that are not firmly under the control of
the central government. We’re beginning to see this phenomenon
of ungoverned space in North Africa, and even in certain parts of
South America, where you have very weak governments that
don’t necessarily have control over the entirety of their physical
domain.
How do you deal with this issue? Obviously, in the first
instance, we want to enable central governments to exert the
control and accept the responsibility they have for the business
that goes on in their own borders. It is not acceptable to me, for
example, for a country to say, when there’s a platform for attacks
within its borders, “That’s not my problem. I can’t do anything
about it;” because, just as your neighbor who allows people to
come into his territory and lob fireballs into your backyard, they
can’t simply evade the responsibility. So every country has a
global responsibility to make sure its space is not a platform to
leverage attacks against its neighbor or someone on the other
side of the globe.
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That means we need to think about what we can do to help
central governments, and in many ways perhaps to compel them
to accept responsibility for ungoverned space. In the first
instance, it means providing them with the tools, if they’re
willing to use them. But in some instances it may mean the
ability of the international community, or even individual
nations, to take defensive steps against terrorist groups that are
lodged in territory of other countries, if the country that has the
authority refuses to exercise it. I think you see an example of
this phenomenon in what the current administration has, I
think, pretty openly acknowledged—the use of unmanned aerial
vehicle strikes against individuals in parts of Pakistan and
Afghanistan. That is a manifestation of this principle. I believe
it’s lawful, but I will tell you, you could probably get a debate
about this from some people in Europe, and that’s one of those
areas where, again, we need to do some serious thinking about
what the legal authorities are in the case of ungoverned space.
A second element of the strategy is to look at those elements
that enable the movement of terrorists and criminals around the
world. I’ve talked about this a couple of times already: the ability
to travel, the ability to finance globally, and the ability to
communicate globally. You can only fight a network with a
network. The way you fight a network is to find the weak points
that bring your opposing network together. That explains a lot of
what we’ve done in the last eight or nine years to deal with
terrorism. I think these are tactics, frankly, that are also useful
against the international organized crime. One thing we’ve done
is focused on finance. We have used the leverage the United
States Government has to put certain financial institutions on
what is, in effect, a black list that says we will not deal with
them, and nobody who deals with us can deal with them. That’s
a way of crippling the flow of money to terrorist groups and to
other groups that threaten the security of the United States and
its allies.
On communications, our capability to intercept communications, and to learn from those communications what our
enemies are planning, is a critical element of the strategy. It
leverages that which is their strength into their weakness. It’s
one of the reasons that the most sensitive communications by
terrorists are now often conveyed in the most primitive ways,
because the fact is, the hardest kind of communication to
intercept is that which one person carries on foot to another
person, whispers in that second person’s ear, and then it goes on
like a game of telephone. So the ability to use our communications capabilities to frustrate theirs is very important.

Do Not Delete

690

9/13/2010 7:09 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:681

A third element, and this is one we made a lot of progress on,
is to focus on the issue of travel by terrorists or criminals. In this
modern world where people have the ability to forge documents,
the kind of travel security measures we had in the 1990s are
simply insufficient to do the job of protecting our country, or any
other country. So, when dealing with travel, we focused on three
elements. How do we first secure documents to make them more
robust? How do we make sure people can’t use phony documents
as weapons to get into the country and carry out attacks? The
9/11 Commission focused on these kinds of phony documents as a
tool for terrorism. It’s one of the reasons we strengthened and
embedded chips in our travel documents. It’s one of the reasons
that we closed some of the loopholes that allowed people to cross
our land borders using a wide variety of very insecure documents
and forced them to use passports, or passport cards, or a small
number of very similar secure documents.
A second element is recognizing that, even with good
document security and watch lists, there are a lot of people out
there who are terrorists whom we don’t know about. We have no
idea what their names are. We don’t have them on a watch list
because, unlike the fellow on December twenty-fifth, their father
didn’t come in and give him up. How do we detect those people?
Well, one of the things we do is we find out a little bit about their
behavior, what their biography is. Some of the commercial data
which the airlines use in order to manage their own passenger
flow and their frequent flyer programs and things of that sort,
turns out to be very valuable in terms of giving us the ability to
see whether a previously unknown terrorist is actually connected
to someone whom we know to be a terrorist.
We once did as an exercise, a couple of years ago, an analysis
going back to 9/11. We asked ourselves, if we had in September
2001 the kind of commercial information we now obtain from the
airlines, could we have connected the dots among the terrorists?
I think the answer is, with the exception of maybe two or three,
we would have seen them all connected. They would have had a
common paymaster who paid for the tickets. They would have
had a common number that was used as a contact number. And,
had we seen that, and knowing that a couple of those people were
on a watch list, that would have very rapidly given us the
capability to identify, I think, fifteen out of the nineteen as
potential threats. To put it another way, the tools we now have
in terms of people’s biography give us an ability to stop the kind
of thing that occurred on September 11, 2001, provided we’re
willing to use them.
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A third enormous capability is the use of biometrics—
fingerprints. Fingerprints are familiar to everybody from things
like crime scene investigation.
They’ve been a great law
enforcement tool. They’re also a terrific tool for protecting us in
terms of travelers. For some years now, we’ve used fingerprints
that we collect from all non-Americans who come into the U.S.
through our airports. We’ve used them to match people against
databases that we have of foreign fingerprints so that if someone,
for example, came in with a passport and a particular name, we
got their fingerprints. Let’s say we said, “You can’t come in.” A
year later they come back with their passport with a different
name, we have them put their fingerprints on the reader. It
shows that they have now changed their identity. That tells us
something we would not have known but for the fingerprinting.
But, even more interesting, we are now in the process of
collecting latent fingerprints from around the world, whether it’s
in Iraq or Afghanistan, battlefields or safe houses. These are the
residual fingerprints of people who have been in training camps
or in safe houses or in other places where mayhem is being
planned or carried out. By using those “latents” and putting
them in a database, we can run the fingerprints of people who
come into the country, or people who want to get a visa, against
that database. We may not know the person’s name, but we’re
going to know there’s something about where they’ve been that
certainly raises a question. I’ll give you two concrete examples of
how this works. First, soon after we put that program into effect,
someone in another country came to get a visa to come to the
U.S. We got their ten fingerprints. We ran them against the
database, and we discovered that one of the fingerprints matched
the fingerprint that had been taken off a piece of paper found in
an apartment in Europe that had been the site for some bomb
building for one of the plots that someone tried to carry out in the
last several years.
Now it turns out there was actually an innocent explanation
for why that fingerprint was there. You know, people can be in
and out of an apartment. Sometimes someone would’ve been
there afterwards and not at the time the bomb was being built.
But that’s at least the kind of thing you want to know to ask the
question. It may be in the end, when you ask the question, that
the answer you get exculpates the traveler. But I’d sure rather
know and ask the question than not know and find out that the
guy coming in to the country used to be working in a bomb
factory.
In a different example, we had a fellow in 2004 or 2005 who
came into O’Hare Airport. He was turned away by the immi-

Do Not Delete

692

9/13/2010 7:09 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 13:681

gration official who was on duty that day, but we captured his
fingerprints. We discovered a couple of years later, when we ran
through his fingerprints again, that the fingerprints were on the
steering wheel of a truck bomb that was detonated in Baghdad.
That told us that this individual, who had been turned away,
became a suicide bomber two years later. So the ability to use
biometrics is a huge capability, in terms of dealing with global
travel, which is such a major part of global terrorism and
organized crime.
Finally, let me conclude by saying the last element of the
strategy is increasing the security of our own physical borders,
whether it’s our maritime borders or our land borders. The fact
is, we have very large borders—thousands of miles. It is
demanding and difficult to deal with the traffic that comes across
the borders. There’s a lot more to be done, but we’ve at least
made significant progress. Up to now terrorists seem, generally
speaking, to prefer to travel by air and come through ports of
entry rather than to sneak across the border, but I wouldn’t want
to count on that always being the case. And, certainly, I wouldn’t
want to assume that in five years, depending on how things go in
Mexico, that we’re not going to begin to see some movement of
terrorists across that border, which is why I think it’s important
that we continue to build on the progress we’ve made with
fencing, doubling the border patrol, and building technology, in
order to increase the ability to have control over our southern
border.
This is probably not a really optimistic speech, but I do think
it tells us a couple of interesting things. First of all, the kind of
war we fight in the future is going to look an awful lot like what
we’ve done with respect to international organized crime. In fact,
the idea that you can separate these things into two domains is
probably not realistic anymore. We’re going to see a lot of
movement back and forth. I like to say that the latter part of the
twentieth century was a kind of digital age of dealing with these
issues because it was binary. It was either war, which was dealt
with by military, or it was crime, which was dealt with by law
enforcement. But we’re now in what we call a quantum age of
dealing with security threats, where the same security threat can
be a law enforcement issue and a military issue at the same time.
The enemies of our safety and security move back and forth
simultaneously across the whole spectrum, and therefore require
us to be able to engage across the whole spectrum.
The second thing, which I think is probably pertinent to this
audience, is this means more work for lawyers. I don’t mean just
prosecutors and defense attorneys. I mean thinking of what it
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means in our legal regime to deal with this very fluid situation.
To ask questions about what our authority is to protect ourselves
in ungoverned space overseas. What are the limits of what we
should collect and shouldn’t collect from people who are traveling
in order to make sure that we’re not putting our country in
jeopardy? These are very challenging legal issues, and they
require a lot of novel and out-of-the-box thinking. I don’t know if
it pays well, but it certainly provides a lot of opportunity for
lawyers to do their work and apply their trade. And I suspect
that a fair number of people in this room will, in one way or
another, be engaged in doing this kind of work in the years to
come.
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